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1 Introduction
The contribution of technological change to economic growth is incontestable. Makri et al.
(2006) presents empirical evidence revealing that more than 50% of the economic growth during
19452002 in the U.S. is accredited to R&D investments within the high-technology sector.
Moreover, during 2000-2006, the 10 largest U.S. companies increased their R&D spending by
42%.1 In addition, numerous empirical studies reveal that innovation in the form of development
of new products and cost reducing processes facilitates rms to achieve a competitive advantage
in the market in which they operate.2
Stylized facts indicate that modern corporations are characterized by separation of owner-
ship and management (e.g., Fama and Jensen 1983, Jensen and Meckling, 1976). A large body
of the theoretical literature on delegation analyzes the incentives of owners to strategically del-
egate decisions to their managers that lead away from prot maximization. A leading model
within this literature is the VFJS model 3 which assumes that owners o¤er a sales bonus to their
managers in order to inuence the behavior of rival rms in their favor. Recently, researchers
have focussed their attention on the investigation of the proper incentives for managers that
foster rmsR&D investments.4
This paper aims to investigate the relation between strategic managerial contracts, inno-
vation and rm performance in a market in which owners choose their rmsorganizational
structure. In particular, each rms owners choose whether they will delegate both R&D invest-
ments and market competition decisions to their manager (Full Delegation strategy), or they
will delegate only market competition decisions to him (Partial Delegation strategy). More
specically, we address the following questions: Which are the e¤ects of alternative congu-
rations of organizational structures on the rmsR&D investments and market performance?
Which organizational structure will rmsowners select in equilibrium? Do we expect dele-
gation of R&D decisions to be a widespread strategy in real world markets? What are the
welfare e¤ects of each conguration of organizational structures? Are the market and societal
incentives aligned?
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To do so, we consider a homogenous Cournot duopoly. We follow the VFJS model, with one
important departure. Owners, besides output decisions, can delegate R&D investment decisions
to their managers as well. In particular, we consider a four-stage basic game with observable
actions. In the rst stage, rmsowners decide whether to follow a Full Delegation (FD), or
a Partial Delegation (PD) strategy. If an owner chooses FD, he makes a take-it-or-leave-it
o¤er to his manager specifying the incentive parameter for both the R&D and output decisions.
Otherwise, he takes no action. In the second stage, R&D investments are chosen by the rms
decision making agents (a rms manager in case of FD or its owner in case of PD). In the third
stage, if a rms owner has chosen PD, he makes a take-it-or-leave-ito¤er to his manager
specifying the incentive parameter for the output decision alone. In the last stage, managers
compete in quantities. We also consider a pre-play game in which in stage 0, rmsowners
announce (and precommit) to the delegation strategies that they will follow in the future.
In this context, the rmsorganizational structures arise endogenously as a consequence of
strategic interactions between competing rms in the market. There are four possible equilib-
rium congurations of organizational structures in the market: Universal Full Delegation, (FD,
FD), in which both rmsowners choose the FD strategy; Universal Partial Delegation, (PD,
PD), in which both rmsowners choose the PD strategy; and the two Asymmetric Delegation
congurations, (FD, PD) and (PD;FD), in which one rms owners choose FD while the
rival rms owners choose PD:5
We nd that the conguration of organizational structures a¤ects crucially rmsR&D
e¤orts and protability. In particular, R&D investments are higher under the Universal FD
than under the Universal PD conguration. The reason is that under Universal FD rms
managers, who are directed to be more aggressive than strict prot maximization, decide over
R&D investments, while R&D decisions are taken by prot maximizing owners under Universal
PD: In addition, under the Asymmetric Delegation conguration, the rm that chooses the
FD strategy becomes leader in incentives, and thus, invests more in R&D and obtains higher
prots than any rm in the Universal FD and PD congurations and also than its rival rm
that chooses the PD strategy. Moreover, the rms prots are higher under the Universal
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FD than under the Universal PD conguration as long as rms endowed initially with an
e¢ cient technology. There is scant empirical evidence on the relation between R&D e¤orts
and delegation schemes which is mixed. Our results are partially in line with a strand of the
literature that establishes a positive relation between managerial incentives departing from
strict prot maximization with rms R&D investments (Makri et al. 2006; Lin et al. 2010). 6
Regarding the equilibrium conguration of organizational structures, we nd that the Uni-
versal PD is never an equilibrium conguration. In the basic game, the Universal FD cong-
uration arises in equilibrium, but only if the initial marginal cost is high enough. Otherwise,
the asymmetric delegation is an equilibrium conguration. Surprisingly, we show that ex-ante
symmetric rms may turn out to be ex-post asymmetric in all aspects, i.e., in their nal pro-
duction technologies, outputs and protability. This is in line with the empirical evidence
which is though limited and inconclusive. Colombo and Delmastro (2004), examining delega-
tion decisions in a sample of 438 Italian manufacturing rms, report that in some cases rms
owners delegate only short-run decisions, such as output, to their managers, while in others
they delegate long-run decisions, such as R&D investments, as well.
We further show that in the pre-play game, the Universal FD is the unique equilibrium con-
guration. Hence, we point out that the assumption used in the literature about the existence
of a pre-play game stage in which rmsowners announce and precommit to the delegation
strategies that they will follow in the future is not innocuous.
Regarding welfare, we show that all organizational structure congurations lead to higher
welfare than under no delegation. Moreover, that the Asymmetric conguration leads to the
highest welfare, while the Universal FD conguration leads to the lowest welfare. As a conse-
quence, market and societal incentives are not always aligned.
Finally, we investigate the impact of R&D spillovers, as well as of price competition, on the
equilibrium market outcomes. As expected, the existence of low R&D spillovers does not alter
our main ndings. However, high spillovers may lead to reversals in the equilibrium output
rankings and, more importantly, to Universal FD being the unique equilibrium conguration.
Moreover, in contrast to quantity competition, under price competition, Universal PD arises in
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equilibrium for all degrees of product substitutability. In this case, managers are less aggressive
than their owners and thus, a PD strategy results in higher cost reducing R&D investments,
making the rm more competitive in the market.
The contribution of our paper is two-fold. First, we contribute to the broad literature that
examines the e¤ects of alternative rmsorganizational structures on the rmsR&D invest-
ments, market outcomes and welfare, as well the endogenous emergence of these alternative
organizational structures in the market. The bulk of this literature focuses on agency theory
issues that neglect strategic interactions arising among oligopolistic rms.7 Our paper belongs
to a recent branch of the literature that studies how strategic delegation of decisions from own-
ers to managers a¤ects rms R&D investments and production decisions. Zhang and Zhang
(1997) were the rst to study how the separation of ownership and management a¤ects rms
R&D investment and output decisions. They consider a Cournot duopoly in which both rms
choose simultaneously either the Full Delegation or the No Delegation strategy. They nd
that, under the Full Delegation strategy, if R&D spillovers are low enough, rms invest more
in cost-reducing R&D and produce higher output comparing to No Delegation. The opposite
holds for high R&D spillovers. However, rms always obtain lower prots under Full Delegation
than under No Delegation.8 In a similar vein, Kopel and Riegler (2006, 2008) endogenize the
selection between Non-Delegation and Full Delegation, by assuming a pre-play game in which
rival owners announce and precommit to their future delegation strategies. In this setup, Kopel
and Riegler (2008) show that R&D spillovers do not a¤ect rmsowners choice of organiza-
tional structure, which is to always choose Full Delegation. Our paper departs from the above
literature in four ways. First, we extend the ownersstrategy space by also including Partial
Delegation as a possible ownerschoice of organizational structure. Second, besides the pre-play
game scenario considered in the literature so far, we also examine the time consistent scenario
in which rmsowners are unable to announce and precommit to the delegation strategies that
they will follow in the future. Third, we investigate the welfare e¤ects of the alternative orga-
nizational structure congurations in the market. Fourth, we examine the e¤ects of product
di¤erentiation and price competition to rmsowners incentives to delegate R&D investments
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decisions to their managers.9 In contrast to the received literature, we show that Full Dele-
gation may not be a rms ownerschoice of organizational structure if owners can optimally
adjust their delegation strategies over time. This highlights that owners precommiting to future
delegation strategies is not an innocuous assumption and has profound e¤ects for market and
societal outcomes.
Second, our paper contributes to the literature that investigates the endogenous emergence
of asymmetric performance among ex-ante symmetric rms operating in the same industry.10
In particular, our paper belongs to a strand of the literature that considers di¤erences in
organizational structure as a source of such asymmetry (e.g., Bloom and Van Reenen 2010;
Gal-Or 1997; and Caillaud and Rey 1994). Yet, these papers ignore the role of innovation
as a source of asymmetric performance. When rms can spend on cost-reducing R&D before
deciding their outputs, we show that ex ante symmetric rms in an industry may end up being
ex post asymmetric in their performance, whenever rmsorganizational structures result from
their ownersstrategic selection of managerial incentives schemes. In particular, rmsowners
choice to remunerate managers with contracts that depart from prot maximization may create
asymmetries between rival rms in terms of their R&D expenditures and their performance in
the same industry. This nding is in sharp contrast to the received literature on the strategic use
of managerial incentive contracts (VFJS model; Miller and Pazgal 2001, 2002, 2005; Jansen et al.
2007, 2009). In the absence of R&D investments, their main nding is that ex ante symmetric
rms perform equally in equilibrium, because rmsowners choose the same incentive contract
to induce a more aggressive behavior of their managers in the market. Instead, by including
R&D investments and Partial Delegation in the rms spectrum of decisions, we show that
asymmetric equilibria could arise in which some rms choose not to delegate all decisions to
their managers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. In Section
3, the alternative organizational structure congurations are analyzed and compared among
them. Section 4 investigates the conditions under which alternative organizational structure
congurations arise in equilibrium. Section 5 conducts a welfare analysis. Section 6 discusses
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price competition, while Section 7 examines the robustness of our main results in the presence of
R&D spillovers. Finally, Section 8 provides some concluding remarks. All proofs are relegated
to the Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a homogenous good industry in which two rms, denoted by i, j = 1; 2; with
i 6= j, compete in quantities. The inverse demand function for the good is P (Q) = 1   Q,
where Q = q1 + q2 is the aggregate output. Firms are endowed with constant returns to scale
production technologies and their marginal cost is initially equal to c; with c < 1. Firm i, by
investing r
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x2i in R&D activities, can reduce its marginal cost to c   xi. This quadratic R&D
cost specication reects diminishing returns to R&D expenditures (see e.g. dAspremont and
Jacquemin 1988), with the parameter r measuring the e¤ectiveness of the R&D technology. The
higher r is, the higher are the required R&D expenditures for a given marginal cost reduction
and the less e¤ective is the R&D technology. Firm is total cost is: Ci(:) = (c xi)qi+ r2x2i .11 To
guarantee well-behaved interior solutions under all parameter values12 we make the following
assumption:
Assumption 1: :3  c < 1 and r  5.
Assumption 1 requires that both the initial marginal cost and the e¤ectiveness of the R&D
technology are not too low.
Firm is prots are:
i = (1  qi   qj)qi   (c  xi)qi   r
2
x2i ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j (1)
Each rm i has an owner and a manager. Following Fershtman and Judd (1987), owner
is a decision maker whose objective is to maximize the rms prots, while manager is an
agent hired by the owner to make decisions on a spectrum of tasks.13 Each rms owner can
compensate his manager by o¤ering a take-it-or-leave-it incentive contract to him.14 The
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incentive contract structure is assumed to take a particular form. The risk-neutral manager i
is paid at the margin, in proportion to a linear combination of own prots and own sales.15 In
particular, the manager of rm i is given an incentive to maximize:
Mi = aii + (1  ai)Ri (2)
where i and Ri are rm is prots and revenues respectively,16 and ai; ai  1; is themanagerial
incentive parameter. Observe that if ai = 1, manager is behavior coincides with owner is
objective for strict prot-maximization. If ai < 1, rm is manager moves away from strict
prot-maximization towards including consideration of sales and thus, he becomes a more
aggressive seller in the market. Hence, the lower the managerial incentive parameter set by
owner i is, the higher is the aggressiveness of his manager.
Each rm is owner can delegate either both the R&D investment and output decisions to
his manager (Full Delegation strategy, FD), or the output decision alone (Partial Delegation
strategy, PD). In the latter case, the R&D decision is taken by the owner himself.17 ;18 In order
to investigate the delegation strategies that rmsowners are expected to follow in equilibrium,
as well as the e¤ects of such strategies on market outcomes, we consider a basic game and a
pre-play game.
The basic game is a four-stage game with observable actions. The sequence of moves unravels
as follows:
Stage 1: Each rm is owner can make an o¤er of a take-it-or-leave-it contract to his
manager specifying the incentive parameter for both the R&D and output decisions, aFDi ; in
which case we say that owner i follows an FD strategy. The manager then accepts or rejects
the o¤er. If, instead, a rms owner prefers to keep the R&D decision for himself (i.e., if he
opts for a PD strategy), he takes no action at this stage.
Stage 2: Each rm is decision maker (its manager in case of FD strategy or its owner in
case of PD strategy) chooses the rms R&D investment level in order to maximize its objective
function.
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Stage 3: If a rms owner has opted for the PD strategy in Stage 1, he makes an o¤er of a
take-it-or-leave-itcontract to his manager specifying the incentive parameter for the output
decision, aPDi . The manager then accepts or rejects the o¤er. Otherwise, the owner takes no
action.
Stage 4: Each rm is manager chooses its rms output.19
The above timing of the game guarantees that all decisions are time consistent. In particular,
a rm is owner choice of an incentive parameter aPDi in Stage 1 cannot be credible, because it
is common knowledge that he will have incentives to revise this parameter choice at Stage 3,
once rmsR&D decisions have been taken in Stage 2. In the same vein, rmsR&D decisions
are expected to be taken strategically in Stage 2 in order to inuence the choice of the incentive
parameters in Stage 3 of those owners who have opted for a PD strategy.
We also consider a pre-play game with observable actions. In the latter game, we add a
Stage 0 to the basic game.
Stage 0: Each rm is owner announces (and precommits to) the delegation strategy that
will follow in the continuation of the game. More specically, announcing an FD strategy
implies that the rm is owner plans to choose the incentive parameter for his manager aFDi in
Stage 1, while announcing a PD strategy implies that he will select the incentive parameter
aPDi in Stage 3.
Both games are solved by employing the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) solution
concept.
3 Delegation Strategy Congurations
In this section we analyze the alternative delegation strategy congurations that may arise in
equilibrium. Due to symmetry, these congurations reduce to the following three: Universal Full
Delegation (FD;FD), Universal Partial Delegation (PD;PD), and Asymmetric Delegation
(FD;PD).
It should be noted that the Non-Delegationconguration, (N;N); (i.e., when R&D and
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output decisions are taken by rmsowners), corresponds to the special case in which aFDi =
aPDi = 1: We briey discuss this as a benchmark case.
20 Firmsowners rst decide on their
R&D expenditures and then choose their outputs. Firm is reaction function in the output
competition stage is, qi = RNq (qj) =
1 qj (c xi)
2
: The respective one in the R&D investments
stage is, xi = RNx (xj) =
4(1 c xj)
9r 8 . Observe that both rmsoutputs and R&D investments are
strategic substitutes. Equilibrium output, R&D investments, and prots are, respectively:
qN =
3r(1  c)
9r   4 ; x
N =
4(1  c)
9r   4 ; 
N =
r(9r   8)(1  c)2
(9r   4)2 (3)
Turning to our main analysis, the last stage of the game is common across all three delegation
strategy congurations. Each rm is manager sets output to maximize (2). From the rst order
condition, the reaction function of manager i is:
qi = Rq(qj) =
1  qj   ai(c  xi)
2
(4)
Manager i thus perceives ai(c   xi) as its rms marginal production cost, which is lower
than the true marginal cost for all ai < 1. The lower the incentive parameter that owner i
sets, the lower is the marginal cost that manager i perceives and thus, the more aggressive
he becomes in the output setting game. Solving the system of rst order conditions, rm is
output is:
qi(xi; xj; ai; aj) =
1  2ai(c  xi) + aj(c  xj)
3
(5)
The following observations are in order. First, @qi
@ai
< 0; i.e., the lower the incentive parameter
that owner i sets, the higher is the aggressiveness of his manager and thus the higher is rm
is output. In contrast, @qi
@aj
> 0; that is, a lower managerial incentive set by the rival owner
leads rm is manager to decrease output. Second, @qi
@xi
> 0 and @qi
@xj
< 0. Clearly, as rm is
R&D increases, the rms perceived (and true) marginal cost decreases, leading his manager to
set a higher output. The opposite holds when the rival rm increases its R&D investments and
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becomes relatively more e¢ cient in the market.
3.1 Universal Full Delegation (FD;FD)
Consider rst the Universal FD conguration.21 In the third stage there is no action. In the
second stage, each manager i invests in R&D so as to maximize his objective function, which
using (4) can be written as: Mi(xi; xj; ai; aj) = [qi()]2  ai r2x2i . The latter reects the fact that
manager i perceives ai r2x
2
i as its rms R&D costs, which are lower than the rm is true R&D
costs as long as ai < 1: Hence, in this case, not only the marginal production cost, but also the
R&D costs of the rm are discountedby a factor equal to the incentive parameter set by its
owner. The lower the latter is, the lower are the rms R&D costs that manager i perceives
and thus the more aggressive manager i becomes in the R&D setting game.
From the rst order condition,22 the reaction function of manager i is:
xi = R
FD
x (xj) =
4[1  2aic+ aj(c  xj)]
9r   8ai (6)
It is easy to see that for all 0 < ai  1; @RFDx@xj < 0; that is, rival rmsR&D e¤orts are strategic
substitutes (as in the Non-Delegation case). The higher is the rival rms R&D investment
level, the lower is the R&D e¤ort that manager i undertakes. Further, it can be checked that
under Assumption 1, when ai = aj the manager is R&D reaction function is always steeper
and is an outward shift of the respective owner is in the Non-Delegation case.
Solving the system of rst order conditions, rm is R&D investments are:
xFDi (ai; aj) =
12r(1  2aic+ ajc)  16aj(1  aic)
27r2   24r(ai + aj) + 16aiaj (7)
It can be checked that under Assumption 1, @x
FD
i
@ai
< 0 and @x
FD
i
@aj
> 0: Clearly, a more
aggressive manager i (lower ai) chooses a higher R&D e¤ort because he perceives his rms
R&D costs to be lower. Moreover, the higher is aj, and thus the less aggressive is manager j,
the higher are the incentives of manager i to spend on R&D because in this case, its rm is
expected to produce a relatively higher output. This is the well-known in the literature output
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e¤ect (see e.g., Bester and Petrakis, 1993). The above observations reveal that owners may
strategically choose the incentive parameters for their managers in the rst stage in order each
to inuence his rival managers choice of R&D e¤ort. In fact, by directing its manager towards
a more aggressive behavior, owner i may discourage manager j from spending on his rms
R&D activities.
In the rst stage, each owner i makes an o¤er of a take-it-or-leave-it contract to his
manager specifying the incentive parameter ai; so as to maximize prots FDi (ai; aj). The
latter can be obtained by substituting (7) into (5) and (1). Each manager then accepts the
o¤er, as it satises his participation constraint. From the rst order condition, the reaction
function of owner i is:
ai = R
FD
a (aj) =
(3r   4aj)[3r(16 + 9r)  32aj]  3cr[128a2j   300raj + 27r2(6  aj)]
4(3r   2aj)f6(3r   4aj)  c[3r(4 + 9r)  2aj(4 + 27r)]g (8)
It can be checked that under Assumption 1, @R
FD
a
@aj
< 0,23 i.e., managerial incentives are
strategic substitutes. As owner j directs his manager towards a relatively less aggressive be-
havior, the rival owner manipulates his managers behavior in the opposite direction in order
to push him towards higher R&D e¤ort and output and in this way, to increase rm is market
share and prots.
Exploiting symmetry, the equilibrium managerial incentive parameter is:
aFD =
3cr(45r + 44)  8(9 + 4r) 	
8[c(27r + 4)  12] (9)
where 	 =
q
 512(9r   2)  96rc(9r   28)(9r   2) + 9r2c2[784 + 9r(225r   424)].
It can be checked that under Assumption 1, 0 < aFD  1: Note that @aFD
@r
> 0 and
@aFD
@c
> 0: The higher are the rmsmarginal production and R&D costs, the more reluctant
are their owners to direct their managers to more aggressive behavior. This is so because the
ensuing prots from delegation are lower in this case.
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From (9), we get respectively each rms equilibrium R&D investments, output and prots:
xFD =
16(9r   2)  3cr(45r   4) + 	
24r(9r   2) ; q
FD =
3r
4
xFD; FD =
rxFD
8
[6(1  c)  (9r 2)xFD]
(10)
3.2 Universal Partial Delegation (PD;PD)
We next consider the Universal Partial Delegation conguration. In the third stage, each owner
i makes an o¤er of a take-it-or-leave-it contract to his manager specifying the incentive
parameter ai; so as to maximize prots. The latter from (7), and after some manipulations,
can be written as: i(ai; aj; xi; xj) = [qi()]2   (1   ai)(c   xi)qi()   r2x2i . Each manager then
accepts the o¤er, as it satises his participation constraint. From the rst order condition,24
the reaction function of owner i is:
ai = R
PD
a (aj) =
6c  1  6xi   aj(c  xj)
4(c  xi) (11)
Note that @R
PD
a
@aj
< 0. As above, managerial incentives are strategic substitutes. Reacting to
owner j who directs his manager towards a less aggressive behavior, owner i makes his manager
more aggressive so that the latter increases his rms output and prots.
Solving the system of rst order conditions, we obtain the equilibrium incentive parameters,
aPDi (xi; xj) =
6c  1  8xi + 2xj
5(c  xi) (12)
Observe that @a
PD
i
@xi
< 0 and @a
PD
i
@xj
> 0. When rm is R&D investment increases, and thus its
marginal cost decreases, the owner i has incentives to direct his manager to a more aggressive
behavior in the output setting stage. This is so because a more e¢ cient rm has relatively more
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to gain by expanding its own output and thus forcing its rival to drastically reduce its output.
For a similar reason, when the rival rm j becomes more e¢ cient (higher xj), rm is output
expansion is not too rentable and thus owner i directs his manager to a less aggressive behavior.
This discussion reveals that owners may invest on R&D strategically in stage two in order to
inuence the incentive parameters choices in stage three. Indeed, owner i may invest relatively
more on R&D in order to prevent his rival owner from making his manager too aggressive.
In the third stage there is no action. In the second stage, owners simultaneously set their
R&D investments so as to maximize their prots, which after some manipulations, can be
written as: i(xi; xj) = 12 [q
PD
i (xi; xj)]
2   r
2
x2i , with q
PD
i (xi; xj) =
2
5
(1  c+ 3xi   2xj):
From the rst order condition,25 the reaction function of owner i is:
xi = R
PD
x (xj) =
12(1  c  2xj)
25r   36 (13)
Note that as above, R&D investments are strategic substitutes (@R
PD
x
@xj
< 0) here too. By
exploiting symmetry, we obtain the equilibrium R&D investments:
xPD =
12(1  c)
25r   12 (14)
Finally, each rms equilibrium incentive parameter, output, and prots are, respectively:
aPD =
5(6c  1)r   12
25cr   12 ; q
PD =
5r
6
xPD; PD =
2r(25r   36)(1  c)2
(25r   12)2 (15)
It can be checked that 0  aPD  1. Note that @aPD
@r
> 0 and @a
PD
@c
> 0: As in the case of
Universal Full Delegation, here too owners are more reluctant to make their managers aggressive
when their production and R&D costs become higher.
3.3 Asymmetric Delegation Conguration (FD;PD)
We nally turn to the Asymmetric Delegation conguration case. Without loss of generality,
assume that owner 1 follows the FD strategy and owner 2 the PD one. In the third stage,
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owner 2 makes an o¤er of a take-it-or-leave-itcontract to his manager specifying the incentive
parameter a2; so as to maximize prots that, as above, are given by 2(x1; x2; a1; a2) = [q2()]2 
(1   a2)(c   x2)q2()   r2x22. Manager 2 then accepts the o¤er, as it satises his participation
constraint. From the rst order condition, the incentive parameter of owner 2 is:
aA2 (x1; x2; a1) =
6c  1  6x2   a1(c  x1)
4(c  x2) (16)
Observe that owner 2, who is follower in setting the managerial incentive, optimally reacts
to a more aggressive behavior chosen by the leader owner 1 for his manager, by directing
his manager to a less aggressive behavior (@a
A
2
@a1
< 0). The latter reveals that owner 1 may
strategically choose his managers incentives in stage one, in order to force his rival owner to
direct his manager to a less aggressive behavior later on. Further, as in the Universal Partial
Delegation case, an increase in own R&D investments results in a more aggressive behavior for
rm 2s manager (@a
A
2
@x2
< 0), while the opposite holds when rm 1s R&D investments increase
(@a
A
2
@x1
> 0).
In the second stage, manager 1 and owner 2 choose R&D investment levels, so as the
former to maximize his objective and the latter its rms prots, which are respectively, M1 =
[q1(x1; x2; a1; a
A
2 ())]2   a1 r2x21 and 2 = 12 [qA2 (x1; x2; a1; aA2 ())]2   r2x22:
From the rst order conditions, the reaction functions of manager 1 and owner 2 are, re-
spectively:
x1 = R
A
x (x2) =
3[1 + (2  3a1)c  2x2]
8r   9a1 ; x2 = R
A
x (x1) =
1  2c+ a1(c  x1)
2(r   1) (17)
Note that R&D investments are again strategic substitutes, i.e.,@R
A
x (xi)
@xi
< 0: Moreover,
an increase in manager 1s aggressiveness (a lower a1set by his owner in the rst stage) has
a negative impact on the rival rm 2s R&D investments and a positive impact on own R&D
investments. Clearly, a more aggressive manager 1 will increase its rms R&D investments. On
the other hand, the rival owner 2 will decrease R&D expenditures since he expects a signicant
output contraction for his rm, that would result from the more aggressive manager 1s output
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setting in the last stage.
Solving the rst order conditions, rmsR&D investments are:
xA1 (a1) =
3(r   2) + 6cr   3a1c(3r   2)
8r(r   1)  3a1(3r   2) ; x
A
2 (a1) =
4r   8cr + a1[ 6 + c(6 + 4r)]
8r(r   1)  3a1(3r   2) (18)
It can be checked that @x
A
1
@a1
< 0; while @x
A
2
@a1
> 0: This is in line with our discussion above and
conrms that owner 1 may strategically choose his managersincentives in order to reduce its
rivals manager R&D spending.
In the rst stage, owner 1 makes an o¤er of a take-it-or-leave-itcontract to his manager
specifying the incentive parameter a1; so as to maximize his prots which can be written as:
2 =
1
2
[qA2 (x
A
1 (); xA2 (); a1; aA2 ())]2   r2 [xA2 ()]2. Manager 1 then accepts the o¤er, as it satises
his participation constraint. From the rst order condition, we obtain the equilibrium incentive
parameter for manager 1:
aA1 =
(r   2)[r(8r + 9]  6]  2cr[r(16r   49 + 22]
(3r   2)f6(r   2)  c[r(8r   19)  6]g (19)
Substituting (19) into (18) and these into (16), we get the equilibrium incentive parameter
for manager 2:
aA2 =
(r + 2)[6 + r(4r   17)]  4cr[r(7r   25) + 10]
2[6 + r(4r   17)]  cr[(24r   83)r + 34] (20)
It can be checked that 0 < aA2 < 1 and a
A
1 < a
A
2 : Interestingly, a
A
1 is not always positive. In
fact, aA1  0 if and only if c  ec where ec = (r 2)[r(8r+9) 6]2r[r(16r 49)+22] , with decdr < 0 and ec(5) = 0:4051: The
leader in setting managerial incentives owner 1 directs his manager to a more aggressive behavior
than the follower owner 2 does. In fact, when the initial marginal cost is low enough, the leader
owner 1, instead of rewarding his manager for prots, he penalizes him by overcompensating
him for rms sales. Further, as above, @a
A
i
@c
> 0; i = 1; 2: On the other hand,@a
A
1
@r
> 0; while
@aA2
@r
< 0: Intuitively, as the R&D technology becomes more e¤ective (lower r), the leader in
setting managerial incentives owner 1 directs his manager to be more aggressive. Then, as
stated above, the follower owner 2 reacts by setting a less aggressive behavior for his manager.
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Finally, each rms equilibrium R&D investments, output, and prots are:
xA1 =
6(r   2)(1  c)
r(8r   25) + 6 ; x
A
2 =
2(1  c)(4r2   17r + 6)
(3r   2)[r(8r   25) + 6); q
A
1 =
2r
3
xA1 ; q
A
2 = rx
A
2 (21)
A1 =
2r(r   2)2(1  c)2
(3r   2)[r(8r   25) + 6]; 
A
2 =
2r(r   1)(1  c)2[r(4r   17) + 6]2
(3r   2)2[r(8r   25) + 6]2 (22)
It can easily be checked that rm 1s R&D investments, output and prots are higher than
the respective ones of rm 2; i.e., xA1 > x
A
2 ; q
A
1 > q
A
2 ; and 
A
1 > 
A
2 : The leader in setting
managerial incentives owner 1 directs his manager to a more aggressive behavior and thus his
manager chooses both R&D e¤ort and output higher than those of rm 2. As a result, rm 1s
prots are higher than those of rm 2:
By comparing the equilibrium values of R&D investments, managerial incentive parame-
ters, output and prots across the three alternative delegation congurations, the following
Proposition results.
Proposition 1 Comparing the Asymmetric Delegation conguration with the Universal Full
Delegation and the Universal Partial Delegation congurations, the following inequalities hold:
(i) aA1 < a
PD < aFD < aA2
(ii) xA1 > x
FD > xPD > xA2
(iii) qA1 > max[q
FD; qPD] and qA2 < min[q
FD; qPD]: Moreover, qFD < qPD if and only if
c < bcq(r)  3(112+40r+75r2)4r(196+75r) , with dbcqdr > 0; and bcq(5) = 0:5745 and limr!1 bcq(r) = 0:75:
(iv) A1 > max[
FD;PD] and A2 < min[
FD;PD]: Moreover, FD > PD if and only if
c < bc(r) where bc(r)  0:45:26
(v) XA = xA1 + x
A
2 > X
FD = 2xFD
(vi) QA = qA1 + q
A
2 > max[Q
FD; QPD], with Qk = 2qk; k = FD;PD
(vii) TA = A1 +
A
2 < min[T
FD; TPD], with Tk = 2k; k = FD;PD
We rst discuss the comparison between the two symmetric delegation congurations and
then turn to the comparison of the latter with the asymmetric one. Regarding the symmetric
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delegation congurations, the intuition behind Proposition 1(i) rests on two facts. First, under
Universal FD both R&D and output costs are discountedaccording to the incentive para-
meter, while only output costs are discounted under Universal PD. Thus, in principle, the FD
conguration may turn out to be costlier for the owners than the PD one. Second, managers
under Universal FD have more degrees of freedom to act strategically (i.e., in both the R&D
and output setting stages) than under Universal PD: Due to the above, owners have lower
incentives to make their managers aggressive under Universal FD.
The rationale behind Proposition 1(ii) is straightforward. Under Universal FD rmsman-
agers decide over R&D investments, while R&D decisions are taken by prot maximizing owners
under Universal PD: As managers are directed to be more aggressive than strict prot maxi-
mization, R&D investments turn out to be higher under Universal FD than under Universal
PD.
As regards Proposition 1(iii), the above analysis reveals that there are two opposite e¤ects
on output. First, under Universal FD rms invest more on R&D than under Universal PD
(Proposition 1(ii)), and this tends to lead to higher output in the former than in the latter
case. Second, under Universal FD owners set a lower level of aggressiveness for their managers,
leading thus to lower output than under Universal PD (Proposition 1(i)). If c > bcq(r), the rst
positive e¤ect dominates the second negative e¤ect and thus output is higher under Universal
FD: This is so because a high initial marginal cost induces higher R&D expenditures, while, at
the same time, it makes rmsowners less keen to direct their managers to a more aggressive
behavior. Thus, for c > bcq(r), the positive e¤ect is intensied, while the negative e¤ect is
attenuated. The opposite is true for low values of the initial marginal cost (c < bcq(r)) and thus
output is higher under Universal PD in this case.
The intuition behind Proposition 1(iv) is rather straightforward. From Proposition 1(ii),
we know that R&D expenditures are always higher under Universal FD than under Universal
PD: Thus, a necessary condition for the prots to be higher in the former case is that market
competition is softer relative to the latter case. This occurs only if the initial marginal cost
is low enough, in which case output is lower under Universal FD (Proposition 1(iii)). In fact,
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only if c is quite low, i.e., c < bc(r) < bcq(r); the softer market competition e¤ect overturns
the higher R&D expenditures e¤ect and prots are higher under Universal FD: The opposite
occurs for higher values of the initial marginal cost, in which case Universal PD leads to higher
rmsprots than Universal FD:
Turning to the comparison of the asymmetric delegation conguration with the symmet-
ric ones, the intuition behind Proposition 1(i-iv) goes as follows. Now the leader in setting
managerial incentives, owner 1, directs his manager to a more aggressive behavior than un-
der any of the two symmetric delegation congurations. Thus, manager 1 chooses relatively
higher levels of R&D e¤ort and output. In contrast, and as discussed above, the follower in
setting managerial incentives owner 2 reacts by choosing to invest less in R&D and by setting
a lower level of aggressiveness for his manager than under Universal FD or PD; manager 2;
in turn, chooses a relatively lower level of output. As a consequence, the leader in incentives
rm 1 dominatesthe market and earns higher prots than any rm under the two symmetric
delegation congurations, while the opposite is true for the follower in incentives rm 2. Fur-
thermore, it is worth noting that the level of managerial aggressiveness set by owner 1 is so high
(remember that aA1 could even be negative) that results in higher industry R&D expenditures
and industry output, yet lower industry protability, in the asymmetric case, as compared with
both symmetric delegation congurations (Proposition 1(v-vii)).
Finally, one can easily check that all delegation congurations lead to higher industry R&D
investments and output than under the benchmark case of non-delegation.27 Then, due to
a more intense competition under delegation, industry protability is lower than under non-
delegation. In fact, even the leader in managerial incentives rm 1 obtains lower prots than
any rm in the non-delegation case.
4 Equilibrium Delegation Congurations
The literature so far has considered only symmetric delegation congurations. More impor-
tantly, it has assumed that rival owners are able to announce (and precommit to) the delega-
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tion strategies that they will follow in the future. In this literature, all rms choose either the
Full Delegation strategy or the Partial Delegation strategy. This is however in contrast to the
empirical evidence (Colombo and Delmastro 2004), that indicates that these two delegation
strategies often coexist in the same industry. As we demonstrate below, the assumption that
owners announce and precommit to specic delegation contracts is not innocuous. By relax-
ing this assumption and allowing only for time consistent rms strategies, the Asymmetric
Delegation conguration may arise in equilibrium under very plausible conditions.
4.1 The Pre-play Game
Following the bulk of the literature, in this subsection we investigate the equilibrium delegation
congurations under the assumption that rmsowners announce (and precommit to) their
delegation strategies. This is reected in the pre-play game in which, in Stage 0, rmsowners
choose between the FD and PD strategy (before they set their respective incentive parameters
in Stage 1 and Stage 3, respectively). Table 1 provides the ownersprots in the ensuing in
Stage 0 2 2 matrix game.
<<PUT TABLE 1 HERE>>
An immediate consequence of Proposition 1(iv) is that the Full Delegation strategy strictly
dominates the Partial Delegation strategy. In particular, if owner i chooses the PD strategy,
then the best response of the rival rms owner is to choose the FD strategy (A1 > 
PD):
In this way, he becomes leader in setting managerial incentives and increases his rms market
share and prots. At the same time, if owner i chooses the FD strategy, then the best response
of the rival owner is to choose the FD strategy as well. Otherwise, the latter becomes follower
in setting managerial incentives and obtains relatively lower prots (A2 < 
FD). Therefore, the
unique equilibrium of the pre-play game is (FD;FD). The following Proposition summarizes:
Proposition 2 If rmsowners are able to announce (and precommit) to the delegation strate-
gies that will follow in the sequel, Universal Full Delegation is the unique equilibrium congu-
ration.
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This nding is in line with empirical evidence revealing that contracts that combine own
prots and sales are widely adopted in rms with high R&D investments (Daroca and Nourayi
2008; and Duru and Iyengar 1999). In addition, it conrms the main result of Zhang and
Zhang (1997) and Kopel and Riegler (2006, 2008) in case that rmsowners have an additional
strategy, the PD strategy, in their disposition.
4.2 The Basic Game
In this subsection we relax the assumption that there is a Stage 0 in which owners announce
(and precommit to) their future delegation strategies. We thus turn to the equilibrium analysis
of the basic game. As is standard in this type of games, we rst propose a candidate equilibrium
delegation conguration, and then check whether it survives all possible deviations.28
The three delegation congurations analyzed in Section 3 are candidate equilibria that should
be tested against all possible deviations. In particular, regarding the Universal FD delegation
conguration, there is (due to symmetry) only one possible deviation. Given owner is FD
strategy with incentive parameter aFD; does owner j has incentives to deviate by taking no
action in Stage 1, thus switching to a PD strategy whose incentive parameter will be chosen
later on in Stage 3? As regards the Universal PD delegation conguration, there is again one
possible deviation. If owner j expects that his rival will follow a PD strategy and will set
the respective incentive parameter in Stage 3, does he have incentives to switch to an FD
strategy, i.e., to o¤er a contract to his manager in Stage 1? Finally, regarding the asymmetric
delegation conguration, there are two possible deviations. First, given owner 1s FD strategy
with incentive parameter aFD1 ; does owner 2 has incentives to switch to an FD strategy and
set its (best-response) incentive parameter in Stage 1 too? And second, if owner 1 expects that
his rival will follow a PD strategy and will set the incentive parameter in Stage 3, does he
have incentives to switch to a PD strategy as well? The formal analysis is relegated to the
Appendix, with the following Proposition summarizing our ndings:
Proposition 3 (i) If c  cFD(r), then the Universal Full Delegation is an equilibrium cong-
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uration.
(ii) If c  cA(r) the Asymmetric Delegation is an equilibrium conguration.
(iii) The Universal Partial Delegation is never an equilibrium conguration.
Figure 2 illustrates our results. Universal Full Delegation is an equilibrium conguration in
the region to the right of the cFD(r) curve, while Asymmetric delegation conguration is an
equilibrium in the region to the left of cA(r) curve. Note that cFD(r) < cA(r) for all r: Then for
cFD(r) < c < cA(r), there are three equilibrium congurations, the two Asymmetric Delegation
ones and the Universal Full Delegation, which cannot be Pareto ranked. Moreover, for c <
cFD(r); besides the two Asymmetric Delegation congurations, there is also an equilibrium in
mixed strategies, the analysis of which is beyond the scope of this paper.
<<PUT FIGURE 2 HERE>>
It is worth stressing that Proposition 3 is in line with the empirical evidence provided by
Colombo and Delmastro (2004) that shows that the two delegation strategies often coexist in
equilibrium.
The intuition behind Proposition 3(i) goes as follows. If the initial marginal cost is relatively
high, a rms owner has no incentives to switch to a PD strategy, because by non-delegating
R&D e¤ort to an aggressive manager, his rms R&D expenditures will be seen reduced. In
turn, his manager will be put in a relatively disadvantageous position in the output setting
stage, not only due to the rms higher marginal cost, but also because as a follower in setting
managerial incentives owner will typically direct his manager to a relatively less aggressive
behavior. In contrast, if the initial marginal cost is low enough, the deviant owner will typically
direct his manager to a more aggressive behavior in the output setting game. The latter positive
e¤ect more than compensates the negative e¤ect due to the relatively higher marginal cost of
the deviant rm, resulting from its lower R&D expenditures. Note also that the deviant owner
saves on R&D costs too. The overall e¤ect for the deviant owner turns out to be positive. Thus,
(FD;FD) cannot be sustained in equilibrium for low enough c:
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As regards Proposition 3(ii), the intuition goes as follows. We have seen that in the Asym-
metric Delegation conguration, owner 1 directs his manager to be too aggressive, i.e., aA1 is
quite low and could be negative for low values of c. As managerial incentive parameters are
strategic substitutes, the deviant owner 2 will respond by directing his manager to be less ag-
gressive, in particular when the initial marginal cost is relatively low. As a consequence, the
outcome of the resulting Universal Full Delegation deviation game will be quite biased, both
in terms of R&D e¤orts and outputs, against the deviant owner 2. Hence, his deviation prots
will be low and there will be no incentives to deviate from a PD to an FD strategy. The
opposite reasoning applies when the initial marginal cost is relatively high, in which case there
are always deviation incentives for owner 2:
Finally, regarding Proposition 3(iii), the reasoning is along the lines of that o¤ered when
comparing the asymmetric and symmetric delegation congurations (see Section 3). There are
strong incentives to become a leader in setting managerial incentives and thus, (PD;PD) can
never arise as an equilibrium conguration.
5 Welfare Analysis
In this section, we examine the welfare implications of the alternative delegation congurations
and also compare with the total welfare in the benchmark Non-Delegation case.
Total welfare is dened as:
TWm = CSm + Tm; with m = PD;FD;A;N (23)
where CSm = 1
2
(Qm)2 is the consumers surplus and Tm the industry prots. Using the
equilibrium results obtained above, the total welfare corresponding to all scenarios are included
in the Appendix. Our results from the total welfare comparison are included in the following
Proposition:
Proposition 4 Under delegation, Universal Full Delegation leads to the lowest total welfare,
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while Asymmetric Delegation Conguration leads to the highest welfare, with the Universal
Partial Delegation lying in between. Total welfare is always lower under Non-Delegation than
under any Delegation conguration: TWN < TW FD < TW PD < TWA.
Proposition 4 indicates that strategic delegation improves welfare relative to the benchmark
case of Non-Delegation. This is so because delegation intensies market competition, and
thus, consumer surplus is always higher than under Non-Delegation. The increase in consumer
surplus more than compensates for the decrease in rmsprots due to stronger competition,
and thus, total welfare is higher than under Non-Delegation.
Moreover, Proposition 4 informs us that the Asymmetric Delegation conguration leads to
the highest welfare. This is an immediate consequence of Proposition 1. As we saw, industry
output is higher under Asymmetric Delegation than under any of the two symmetric delegation
congurations (Proposition 1(vi)). As a result, consumer surplus is also higher in this case.
The increase in consumer surplus more than compensates for the decrease in the protability
of the rms which, according to Proposition 1(vii), is always lower under the Asymmetric than
under any symmetric delegation conguration.
Further, according to Proposition 4, the Universal Partial Delegation conguration leads to
higher welfare than the Universal Full Delegation one. From Proposition 1(iii) we know that
for low values of initial marginal cost, industry output and thus consumer surplus is higher
under Universal PD rather than under Universal FD: Although prots are sometimes lower
under Universal PD in this case (Proposition 1(iv)), the decrease in industry protability is
more than compensated by the consumer surplus increase and total welfare is higher under
Universal PD than under Universal FD: The reverse reasoning applies for high values of c and
again prots turn out to be higher under Universal PD:
Finally, it follows from Proposition 4 that market and social incentives are not always
aligned. The Asymmetric Delegation conguration which is socially preferable emerges in
equilibrium but only if the initial marginal cost is relatively low. In contrast, if the initial
marginal cost is high enough, the Universal Full Delegation that emerges in equilibrium is the
23
least preferable delegation conguration from the social point of view.
6 Price competition
In this section we consider how our main results may change if alternatively we assume that
rms compete in prices, instead of quantities. We built upon the framework of Section 2 with
one important departure, we assume that rms produce di¤erentiated products. In particular,
we assume that each rm faces the following (inverse) demand function: pi = 1   qi   qj;
i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j, where  2 [0; 1] is the degree of product substitutability. Namely, a higher
 implies higher product substitutability and thus, a more intense market competition among
competing brands. For tractability, and without loss of generality, we assume that r = 5. Thus
we assume that each rm produces one brand of a di¤erentiated good and faces the following
demand function: qi =
(1 ) pi+pj
1 2 i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j.29
In this context, we reconrm the VFJS prediction that, in contrast to quantity competition,
rmsowners under price competition set managerial incentives that correspond to penalizing
sales; equivalently, they optimally choose ai > 1 under all circumstances (see (2)). Further,
our ndings indicate that Universal Partial Delegation is the unique equilibrium delegation
conguration, independently of whether rmsgoods are poor or close substitutes or whether
rmsowners are able to commit, or not, to their delegation strategies. The intuition behind
this result is that since owners are now more aggressive than their managers (recall that, ai > 1),
choosing the PD strategy results in higher cost reducing R&D investments. This allows rms
to become more competitive in the market, and thus earn higher prots than when choosing
the FD strategy.30
7 R&D Spillovers
Throughout the paper we have assumed that there are no R&D spillovers. Let us now examine
how our main results may change in the presence of R&D spillovers. Following Zhang and
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Zhang (1997) and Kopel and Riegler (2006, 2008), the rm is cost and prot functions now
become, Ci(:) = (c xi xj)qi+ r2x2i and i = (1 qi qj)qi (c xi xj)qi  r2x2i , respectively,
where  2 [0; 1] measures the size of the spillover e¤ect. The rest of the specications are as
in the basic model. Following Kopel and Riegler (2006), here too closed form solutions cannot
be obtained, and thus we have to resort to numerical simulations. Assuming that r = 10; and
keeping c as a parameter, we consider a ne grid of values of the spillover parameter , ranging
from :05 to :95: Table 2 reports a sample of our simulations for c = :5 and  = :05; :5; and :95;
i.e., for the cases of low, intermediate and high spillovers, respectively.31
Our simulations indicate that, for relatively low spillovers, most of our main results are
qualitatively similar to those under no spillovers. In particular, Propositions 1 and 2 hold intact
(see Table 2 for  = :05). Regarding Proposition 3, we still have two equilibrium delegation
congurations, the Asymmetric and the Universal FD ones. Interestingly, the Asymmetric
conguration is an equilibrium conguration for a wider range of c values, while for the Universal
FD conguration the opposite holds. For instance, cFD( = :05) = :485 > :36 = cFD( = 0)
and cA( = :05) = :47 > :39 = cA( = 0):Moreover, there is a range of intermediate c values for
which there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. This is in contrast to the case of no spillovers
where multiple equilibria arise under some values of c (see Figure 1).
On the other hand, for intermediate levels of spillovers there are a few ranking reversals
regarding Proposition 1. For instance, managers invest more in R&D under the Universal FD
conguration comparing to all other congurations, leading to lower output and higher prots
than under the Universal PD conguration (see Table 2 for  = :5). Yet, in the pre-play game,
Universal FD is the unique equilibrium conguration, i.e., Proposition 2 holds for intermediate
. Considering Proposition 3, in contrast to the low spillovers case, Universal FD delegation
conguration arises for low values of c, while the opposite is true for the Asymmetric congu-
ration delegation. Non-existence of equilibrium in pure strategies is observed for intermediate
values of c:
Finally, for relatively high spillovers, managers still are overinvesting in R&D under the
Universal FD conguration comparing to all other congurations, however owners under the
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Universal PD conguration increase their R&D investments as well. This leads to higher output
and lower prots under the Universal FD than under the Universal PD conguration (see Table
2 for  = :95). Proposition 2 holds also for high . Interestingly, regarding Proposition 3, in
this case there is a unique equilibrium, the Universal FD conguration equilibrium.
<<PUT TABLE 2 HERE>>
8 Conclusions
We have investigated the relation between strategic managerial incentives, innovation and rm
performance in a duopolistic market in which rmsorganizational structures are endogenous.
We have identied conditions under which rmsowners delegate both long-run decisions (such
as cost reducing R&D expenditures) and short-run decisions (such as output or prices) to their
managers, as well as those conditions under which they delegate only short-run decisions. We
have thus obtained the equilibrium organizational structure congurations that arise in the
market under various circumstances.
We have shown that overall industry R&D expenditures are the highest when rmsowners
select di¤erent organizational structures in a Cournot homogenous good market. That is, when
one rms owners choose to delegate both R&D and output decisions to their manager, while
the rivals owners delegate only the output decision to their managers. This Asymmetric Del-
egation conguration arises in equilibrium whenever the rmsinitial production technology is
e¢ cient (initial marginal cost is low). In this case, ex-ante identical rms end up being ex-post
asymmetric in terms of their R&D e¤ort, output and prots. Further, we have identied con-
ditions under which symmetric delegation congurations emerge in equilibrium. In particular
Universal PD arises in equilibrium under Bertrand competition.
We have also demonstrated that market and societal incentives are not always aligned. While
welfare is higher under an Asymmetric Delegation conguration in the Cournot homogenous
goods case, the equilibrium conguration is Universal FD as long as the initial production tech-
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nologies are relatively ine¢ cient. Finally, our main results remain robust under the existence
of R&D spillovers, provided that these spillovers are relatively low. Otherwise, in the existence
of high level of R&D spillovers Universal FD may be the only equilibrium conguration.
Our ndings provide some guidelines for future empirical research on the e¤ects of rms
owners managerial incentives on oligopolistic rmsinnovation investments and market perfor-
mance, which is so far scant and inconclusive. Empirical analyses should start with a detailed
study e.g. in high technology industries, regarding the e¤ects of the use of managerial contracts
as an incentive mechanism to increase R&D investments. A number of testable hypotheses
arises from our analysis. For instance, R&D investments and protability are expected to be
higher in rms that strategically delegate innovation decisions to their managers, o¤ering them
incentives to depart from strict prot maximization. Another testable hypothesis is that the
probability of a rm delegating R&D investments to non prot maximizing managers is lower
when the rms are initially endowed with e¢ cient production technologies.
Our analysis was carried out in a duopolistic market structure with specic functional
forms - linear demand functions, constant marginal costs and quadratic cost reducing R&D
costs. Our conjecture is that in this simple setting, all the important insights regarding rms
owners incentives to delegate short- and long-run decisions to their managers and the resulting
organizational structures are obtained. Of course, it remains for future research to be checked
to which extent our main results are valid in oligopolistic markets under more general demand
and cost functions with, or without, R&D spillovers. Further, a new strand of the literature
that investigates strategic delegation under the prism of a multiple leaderfollower model in an
n-rm oligopoly, in which entrants consider di¤erent congurations of sales revenue delegation,
deserves attention for further studies (see and Wang, 2009). In particular, it can shed more
light to the question of how the degree and the type of competition may a¤ect rmsR&D and
their overall performance.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
By comparing the equilibrium managerial incentive parameters under the Universal FD and
PD congurations, given by (9) and (15), it can be checked that aFD > aPD always. Further,
by comparing the respective equilibrium R&D investments, given by (10) and (14), it can be
checked that xFD > xPD always. Turning to the equilibrium outputs under Universal FD and
PD;given by (10) and (15), it can be checked that qFD > qPD if and only if c < bcq(r). Finally,
by comparing the respective equilibrium prots, given by (10) and (15), it can be checked that
FD > PD if and only if c < bc(r).
By comparing equilibrium managerial incentive parameters in the Asymmetric Delegation
conguration, given by (19) and (20), with those under Universal FD and PD, it can be
checked that aA1 < a
PD < aFD < aA2 always. Further, by comparing the respective equilibrium
R&D investments (see (21)), it can be checked that xA1 > x
FD > xPD > xA2 always. Turning to
equilibrium outputs and prots (see (21) and (22)), it can be veried that qA1 > max[q
FD; qPD] >
qA2 and 
A
1 > max[
FD;PD] > A2 under all parameter values. Finally, by comparing industry
output and prots in the Asymmetric Delegation conguration with the respective ones under
Universal FD and PD, it can be checked that QA = qA1 + q
A
2 > max[Q
FD; QPD] and TA =
A1 +
A
2 < min[T
FD; TPD] under all parameter values.
Proof of Proposition 3
(i) The (FD;FD) candidate equilibrium: We only need to consider one deviation. Let
owner i follow an FD strategy and set the incentive parameter aFD. Owner j will follow the
same strategy and obtain prots FD only if he does not have incentive to switch to a PD
strategy and postpone the incentive parameter choice for Stage 3. The deviation game unravels
as follows. Given owner is choice of aFD in Stage 1, R&D decisions are taken by manager i and
owner j in Stage 2. Then owner j sets the incentive parameter for his manager in Stage 3 and
nally rmsmanagers choose outputs. It is easy to see that the equilibrium of the deviation
game coincides with that of the asymmetric delegation conguration, with the only exception
that in the rst stage owner i sets ai = aFD: By substituting ai = aFD into (18), and using
(16), (4) and (1), the deviant rm js prots turn out to be:
dj=
2r(r   1)f24(r + 4) + 3	  3c(3r + 4)(13r + 8) + c2r(270r2   195r + 268)  c(2r + 3)	g2
fcr[536 + r(513r   1850)] + 3(3r   2)	  24[r(5r   26) + 8]g2
It is then easy to check that dj  FD if and only if c  cFD(r), where cFD(:) is initially
(slightly) decreasing and then increasing in r; and cFD(5) = 0:3574 (see Figure 2). Therefore,
for all c  cFD(r); (FD;FD) is an equilibrium conguration.
(ii) The (PD;PD) candidate equilibrium: Again we need to consider only one deviation.
If owner j expects that owner i will follow a PD strategy and choose the incentive parameter
for his manager in Stage 3, he will follow the same strategy and obtain PD prots only if he
does not have incentive to switch to an FD strategy and set the incentive parameter for his
manager in Stage 1. In this case, the deviation game unravels as follows. In Stage 1, owner j
sets aj; and in Stage 2, manager j and owner i chose their rmsR&D expenditures. In Stage
3, owner i sets ai, and in the nal stage managers engage in output competition. Clearly, the
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deviation game is the same as the asymmetric delegation conguration game with j = 1 and
i = 2: This is so because owner i knows the whole history of actions (a1; x1; x2) while setting
ai and, moreover, owner j anticipates that owner i will optimally react to this history. An
immediate consequence of Proposition 1(iv) is that dj = 
A
1 > 
PD; hence, (PD;PD) is never
an equilibrium conguration.
(iii) The (FD;PD) candidate equilibrium: Here we need to consider two deviations using
similar reasoning as above. In brief, rst, owner 1 may deviate from an FD to a PD strategy;
and second, owner 2 may deviate from a PD to an FD strategy. The rst deviation game
unravels as follows. In stage 1, there is no action. In Stage 2, owners choose their rmsR&D
expenditures, in Stage 3 they set their managersincentive parameters and in Stage 4 managers
choose output. Clearly, this deviation game is identical to the Universal Partial Delegation
game. Since owner 1 takes no action in Stage 1, it becomes common knowledge that he will set
the incentive parameter in Stage 3. Proposition 1(iv) implies that owner 1 has no incentives to
deviate because the deviant prots are PD; which are always lower than his prots A1 in the
Asymmetric Delegation game.
In the second deviation game, owner 1 sticks to the FD strategy and sets a1 = aA1 ; since
he expects his rival owner to follow the PD strategy and thus set the managerial incentive
parameter in Stage 3. However, the deviant owner 2 sets instead the incentive parameter for
his manager in Stage 1, optimally responding to aA1 : Then in stage 2, managers set their rms
R&D expenditures, and in the last stage they set outputs. Observe that this deviation game
coincides with the Universal Full Delegation game, with the only exception that owner 1 chooses
aA1 instead of a
FD: The optimal response of owner 2 is given by (8), that is, ad2 = R
FD
a (a
A
1 ):
Plugging aA1 and a
d
2 into 
FD
2 (a1; a2) we obtain the deviant rm 2s prots 
d
2.
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checked that d2  A2 if and only if c  cA(r), with @cA@r < 0 and cA(5) = 0:4377 (see Figure
2). Therefore, for all c  cA(r), Asymmetric Delegation is an equilibrium conguration.
Proof of Proposition 4 Total welfare under Universal Full Delegation, Universal Partial Del-
egation, Asymmetric Delegation conguration and Non-Delegation are given by the fol-
lowing expressions, respectively:
TW FD(c; r) =
rxFD
8
[12(1  c)  (9r   4)xFD] > 0
TW PD(c; r) =
12r(1  c)2
25r   12 > 0
TWA(c; r) =
2r(1  c)2f756r   84 + r2[2370r   2113 + r2(140r   999)]g
(3r   2)2[6 + r(8r   25)]2 > 0
TWN(c; r) =
4r(1  c)2
9r   4 > 0
Taking the di¤erences it can be checked that TWN < TW FD < TW PD < TWA for all
permissible parameters values.
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Notes
1In contrast, their capital spending in the same period increased by only 2 percent. See for instance, Leary
(2002) and Mandel et al.(2006).
2Del Monte and Pagani (2003) o¤er a comprehensive literature review on the subject.
3The strategic use of managerial incentive contracts has been introduced by Vickers (1985), Fershtman (1985),
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) (or the VFJS model). In these papers, each rms owner has
the option to compensate his manager with an incentive contract combining own prots and sales or revenues,
in order to direct him to a more aggressive behavior in the market. This can be justied on the grounds of
empirical studies, which suggest that CEO compensation is positively associated with both prot and sales
(Baker et al., 1988; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Lambert et al., 1991). For instance, industry level analyses
suggest that contracts of this type are widely adopted in the CEO compensation practice in U.S. markets with
high R&D investments such as in new economyrms (Daroca and Nourayi, 2008) and in the U.S. electric
utility industry (Duru and Iyengar 1999). See Jansen et al. (2009), Manasakis et al. (2010), and Wang and
Wang (2010), for other delegation schemes used in di¤erent industries.
4Another important branch of the delegation literature assumes away strategic interactions and focusses
instead on agency issues. In contrast to the strategic delegation literature, the managers incentives schemes
here are linked to prot maximization (e.g., Milkovich et al. 1991; Metcalf and Simpson 2009). Such a link,
however, may induce managers to avoid high-risk R&D investments and may, thus, decrease rmsinnovation
activities (see, Baysinger et al. 1991; Hoskisson et al. 1991; Eisenmann 2002; Makri et al. 2006).
5It is straightforward from the VFJS model that, for given technologies, delegation of decisions from owners
to managers is always a dominant strategy. Henceforth, cases in which an owner delegates no decisions to his
manager and sticks to pure prot maximization are not considered here. The (Non-Delegation, Non-Delegation)
conguration is analyzed only as a benchmark case in Section 3.
6Others support, however, that the alliance between managerial incentives and prot maximization is bene-
cial for rms R&D investments and market performance (Milkovich, et al. 1991; Metcalf and Simpson 2009).
7See for instance, Makri et al. 2006; Metcalf and Simpson 2009; Eisenmann 2002; Milkovich et al. 1991;
Baysinger et al. 1991; Hoskisson et al. 1991. Gürtler (2008), in a principal agent model, analyzes the case
in which the owner (principal) endogenously selects between delegating only one of the two available decisions
(Partial delegation) and delegating all available decisions to the agent (Complete delegation).
8Kopel and Riegler (2006) amend the solution of Zhang and Zhang (1997), indicating that due to computa-
tional mistakes, some of their results do not hold.
9A related strand of the literature considers strategic delegation focusing on di¤erent types of long-run
rmsdecisions. For instance, Barcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2005) examine location decisions under price
competition, while Tomaru et al. (2011) examine capacity choice.
10Several factors that are responsible for these asymmetries, such as signicant entry barriers (Besanko and
Doraszelski 2004; Van Long and Soubeyran 2001) and evolutionary forces (Dierickx and Cool 1989) have already
been thoroughly analyzed in the literature. See Amir et al. (2010) and Röller and Sinclair-Desgagni (1996) for
an excellent review.
11In the basic model we assume away R&D spillovers. In section 7, in the spirit of Zhang and Zhang (1997)
and Kopel and Riegler (2006, 2008), we study the impact of R&D spillovers on our main results.
12 i.e., that (i) the second order conditions and stability conditions are satised and (ii) that equilibrium
marginal cost, output, R&D expenditures and prots are always positive.
13As is common practice in the strategic delegation literature, moral hazard issues that may arise in this
context are ignored. The emphasis is instead put on strategic interactions aspects that are rending credible non-
strictly prot maximizing strategies which managers can employ, and which the owners themselves are unable
to follow. See Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), Miller and Pazgal (2001, 2002, 2005),
Jansen et al. (2007, 2009) and Ritz (2008).
14A standard assumption in the strategic delegation literature is that rmsowners have all the bargaining
power during negotiations with their managers and they thus o¤er take-it-or-leave-it incentive contracts to
their managers that leave them with their reservation value.
15The assumption of risk neutral managers is standard in the strategic delegation literature (See for instance,
Vickers1985; Fershtman 1985; Fershtman and Judd 1987; Sklivas 1987; and Miller and Pazgal 2001, 2002, 2005).
In contrast to risk-neutral managers, risk-averse managers react less to the incentives set by the owners, i.e.,
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they stick to a behavior closer to prot maximization. Then owners have lower ability to manipulate their
managers by using appropriate incentive schemes.
16Following Fershtman and Judd (1987), Mi is not the managers reward in general. Since the managers
reward is linear in prots and sales, he is paid Ai + BiMi for some constants Ai, Bi, with Bi > 0. As the
manager is risk-neutral, he acts so as to maximize Mi and the values of Ai and Bi are then irrelevant. These
values are then selected in such a way that the manager´s participation constraint is satised.
17For a related analysis regarding Partial delegation, see also Lambertini and Primavera (2001) and Lo­ er
(2011).
18An owner could delegate only the R&D decision to his manager, keeping the output decision for himself.
However, this alternative Partial Delegation strategy turns out to be strictly dominated by the Full Delegation
strategy and thus never arises in equilibrium (The proof is available from the authors upon request). To keep
the analysis as simple as possible, we do not include this alternative PD strategy in the basic model.
19The timing of the game reects common real business practices where rms rst decide over their long-run
plans (such as R&D expenditures) and, according to them, decide simultaneously about their short-run variables
(such as quantities or prices). See, among others, Zhang and Zhang (1997) and Barcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga
(2005).
20It is well-known in the literature that the Non-Delegation strategy N is strictly dominated by both PD and
FD strategies. Thus, w.l.o.g., we can ignore the N strategy in our analysis. Note that (N;N) is a special case
of Qiu (1997).
21The analysis here is as a special case of Kopel and Riegler (2008) with no R&D spillovers.
22It can be easily checked that the second order and the stability conditions are satised as long as ai > 0:
23Moreover, it can be checked that the second order and stability conditions are satised at (aFD; aFD).
24It can be easily checked that the second order conditions are satised. The stability conditions are also
satised when xi = xj :
25It can be checked that second order and stability conditions are satised.
26In fact, bc(r) varies between 0:444637 and 0:45 and is not monotonic in r:
27More specically, xPD > xN > xA2 , and q
A
2 < q
N < min[qFD; qPD], i.e., only the follower in incentives rm
2 invests less and produces less than any rm under no delegation.
28This solution approach is the only appropriate because the ownersbest response functions are discontinuous
in the basic game. For instance, if owner i has chosen an FD strategy with an incentive parameter aFDi , the best
response of owner j is either to follow an FD strategy with aFDj = Ra(a
FD
i ), or take no action at this stage. The
latter is equivalent to owner j switching to a PD strategy and thus setting his incentive parameter optimally in
Stage 3, given aFDi and the implied from the strategy prole (a
FD
i ; no action) rmsR&D investments in Stage
2.
29To avoid corner solutions we assume that  < 0:85; i.e., that the two goods are not too close substitutes.
30We have also considered the case in which rms produce di¤erentiated products under output competition.
For a detailed analysis of this case see Mitrokostas and Petrakis (2011).
31The detailed analysis is available from the authors upon request.
32This expression is too long to be included in the text. However, it is available from the authors upon
request.
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Table 1: Ownersprots in the ensuing 2 2 matrix game.
FD PD
FD FD;FD A1 ;
A
2
PD A2 ;
A
1 
PD;PD
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Table 2: Simulation results for Proposition 1 under R&D spillovers ()
 = :05
aA1 =0.59101 a
A
2 =0.84206 a
FD =0.78546 aPD =0.77840
xA1 =0.04079 x
A
2 =0.01502 x
FD =0.02729 xPD =0.02438
qA1 =0.28825 q
A
2 =0.15254 q
FD =0.20992 qPD =0.21024
A1 =0.02071 
A
2 =0.01050 
FD =0.01911 PD =0.01912
 = :5
aA1 =0.61772 a
A
2 =0.82141 a
FD =0.78180 aPD =0.77876
xA1 =0.01853 x
A
2 =0.01438 x
FD =0.02112 xPD =0.01680
qA1 =0.26844 q
A
2 =0.17014 q
FD =0.21129 qPD =0.21008
A1 =0.02167 
A
2 =0.01214 
FD =0.02082 PD =0.02065
 = :95
aA1 =0.68628 a
A
2 =0.81290 a
FD =0.76940 aPD =0.78526
xA1 =0.00280 x
A
2 =0.01223 x
FD =0.01487 xPD =0.00911
qA1 =0.24262 q
A
2 =0.18152 q
FD =0.21254 qPD =0.20710
A1 =0.02186 
A
2 =0.01572 
FD =0.02098 PD =0.02103
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Figure 1: Emerging Equilibria under no commitment.
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